Andrea Garaiova | 25.02.2013
The author is an MA student of International Peace and Security at King’s College London, and national of Slovakia, one of the five EU member states which do not recognize Kosovo’s independence.
While Kosovo Albanians celebrated the fifth anniversary of the Kosovar independent state few days ago, painting the Newborn monument in the heart of Pristina with the flags of countries having so far recognized Kosovo and watching the parade of the security forces of the ‘Young European’ state, the Business Insider, an online business oriented newspaper, published a ‘chart’ of the 25 most miserable places on the planet. Kosovo fared bad in this ‘study’, and was assigned 9th position among ‘traditionally’ failing states such as Haiti and Afghanistan, or tensions-ridden ones such as Syria and Zimbabwe.
Both national and foreign newspapers embarked on evaluating the young country’s progress since it declared independence on 17th February 2008, mostly recounting the worrying realities of continuing high unemployment rates, corruption, general economic unease and persisting challenges in the international arena, particularly in relation to the foe-neighbour Serbia. World media broadcasted a Kosovo inhabitant’s constatation that the greatest achievement of independence was freedom. Prosperity, welfare and efficient state governance, however, weren’t achieved in the past 5 years and their lack remained the main source of the ‘flawed’ Kosovar state. Similar reactions came from most of other media sources as well as comments on social networks.
Kosovo has not been included in the Failed States rankings by the Fund for Peace, being excluded from the latter on the basis of not constituting a clearly independent state. While the Failed State index has many drawbacks and numerous critiques have been levelled against its methodology, it has served as a starting point for discussion and evaluation of state capacities of different places of the world. Excluding Kosovo from the list thus deprives it of the chance to be compared with other cases on the basis of the same methodological approaches. This not only enables to draw arbitrary conclusions based on limited factual sources such as the CIA Factbook, as done by the abovementioned Business Insider, but leads to misrepresentations and comparisons that do not add to an accurate evaluation of Kosovo’s progress. While quite substantial work has been done on evaluation of the international involvement in the country, mainly of UNMIK and EULEX – most studies recounting the same drawbacks, comparative studies have lacked, thus not allowing to put the case of Kosovo in the larger context that would enable us to see it in a more pragmatic fashion.
If the Failed States index criteria cannot be applied to analyze developments in Kosovo, due to the latter being excluded from it as well as the impossibility to replicate the vy particular methodology with which the index operates, a much simpler, although by its nature un-comprehensive, evaluation can be made by relying on the Rotberg’s definition of strong and weak states. Using three central criteria of Rotberg’s, it is possible to demonstrate, if nothing else, a tendency of Kosovo’s state-building process. Three main elements constitute the basis for making the judgment – monopoly over the legitimate use of violence, the state’s ability to levy taxes and the capacity to provide basic political and social goods – ranging from security to social welfare. Much has been written about the persisting problems in all of these spheres in Kosovo – the difficulties with strengthening rule of law and fighting organized crime and corruption or with increasing the living standards within its borders. While these need to be acknowledged and understood so that the problems plaguing the ‘Newborn’ can be addressed in an appropriate manner, an overly insistence on them veils the general progress of Kosovo over the past five years in all of the three categories proposed by Rotberg. It certainly has not always been an upward trend. As Holsti rightly notes, moving along the spectrum of state weakness and strength is nowhere a linear process. It seems, nonetheless, that a general amelioration can be ascertained.
This is important because by overemphasizing the under-achievements and underemphasizing successes negative feelings about the development of post-independence Kosovo are risking to undermine the constructive energies in the young Kosovo’s population. Clarity about failures and challenges is essential in order to direct existing resources and instruments towards future betterment. Effective employment of these can, however, be frustrated if disappointment from past mistakes comes to prevail as a dominant sentiment in the society. Kosovo’s young (with an average age of 26,6) and increasingly well-educated populace (many studying abroad thanks to scholarships from international donors) is one of its greatest assets. According to a senior official of the Kosovo government, the country’s people’s creativity, energy and innovative spirit are the main reasons for hope for a better future. Up until now, many of those receiving high-quality education abroad have been willing to return to their homeland and invest their knowledge and experience capital into building and reconstructing the country’s political, economic and social spaces. The disillusionment with the slow progress since Kosovo’s coming into being five years ago is, however, gaining on its intensity and may become a reason for a drain brain of the most qualified individuals in society, thus joining the large kosovar diaspora outside Kosovo’s borders. This phenomenon is well-known to many other countries in Central and Eastern Europe. In Slovakia, for example, high expectations of post-communist prosperity and democracy soon gave way to great general disappointment. Compounded by other phenomena, they created an atmosphere of disempowerment in relation to the ruling elite and of de-motivation to use civic rights and liberties to exercise pressure on those leading the country, consequently deepening the legacy of rift between the state and its citizens, with important ramifications for further reform and development processes in a still-in-transition country.
Similar expectations were present in Kosovo where independence was presented as the all-deseases-curing remedy and the effort was directed towards its achievement. Five years later it is more than clear that independent statehood (although disputed in the case of Kosovo due to international presence and incompleteness of international recognition) is rather a beginning of the solutions finding process than a solution itself. It is understandable that international organizations, having invested significant amounts of resources into post-conflict reconstruction and state-building, as well as citizens and media, are asking the young state to perform to the degree corresponding to the investments made. But the expectations, considering the previous experiences of the UN with peace- and state-building in other corners of the world, appear dramatically inflated. Destroyed infrastructure and industry, parallel structures that sprang up in the face of repression and conflict in the past and inexistent institutions take time to be reconstructed or built anew, often from scratch. What is more, most of the institutions, systems and practices of developed states that Kosovo is trying to live up to require to be rooted in the larger ground of society. If they are new to the latter or they have previously been eradicated or uprooted from it, it will take time to see them take roots.
The current state system exercises further pressure, demanding from new state entities what has developed in the most successful states over several centuries, often through painful processes. It would, however, be unwise to claim that newly created states, such as Kosovo, should be given the same opportunity to go through an equally messy and long genesis eventually leading to emergence of welfare system and rule of law norms. Going back to 17th or 19th century practices is unacceptable in the prevailing normative international order. Nevertheless, it might prove counterproductive to impose too high demands on newly born states. Despite reservations concerning Kosovo’s civil society coming from different and rather numerous directions, Kosovo has developed, also thanks to the substantial international funding arriving from donor organizations after the end of the 1999 conflict, a rather vibrant class of think tanks and non-governmental institutions. While only a handful of them have been active (out of the total number of several hundreds), they were able to gain access to decision-making processes through their providing expertise to the country’s leadership and influencing the public opinion via tv pronouncements and criticism of governmental acts and policies. The post-conflict environment combined with the international funding and promotion of civil society has made a difference, however minor it may seem to those inside of Kosovo. Existence of such social phenomena is far from automatic even in the ‘developed’ states. In Slovakia, again, the post-communist transition has found it difficult to create space for civil society organizations that would be capable of exercising real influence over the country’s governance. The return of in the West educated Kosovars, their integration into governmental and non-governmental policy spaces, the relatively easy access to the media for presenting their outputs to the public are all promising elements. While in Slovakia the last time a larger-scale student activism could be seen was probably during the revolutionary times of 1989, student associations such as the Political Club of the University of Pristina have been active in providing a platform for political discussions and exchanges and have stimulated opinion-making processes among the young, who constitute the dominant group in Kosovo’s population.
Frustration of this dominant category harbouring many wishing to contribute to the development of their homeland would hamper the development itself, political as well as economic. The simplified and simplistic accounts of the situation in Kosovo by the dominant part of international media and the excessive internal and external expectations have the capacity to limit the reform and transformation potential of these groups by insisting too much on things that do not work rather than those that do. This is not to say that critiques should not be presented and flaws exposed. As already asserted, they are indispensable for identifying the right way forward. But they should not lead to undermining the positive creative energies essential for successful transition from post-conflict environment to a strong independent state. The next five years, and probably much longer than that, will be the years of struggle to strike the right balance between these factors for all parts of Kosovo’s society.